Internatlization of production externalities is studied in a general equilibrium economy. Production plans are decided by majority voting. Consumers are interested in some degree of internalization depending on their portfolios because they care about dividends of their portfolios rather than dividends of firms. The shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote) are compared with respect to internalization of externalities. In general the stakeholder democracy performs better that the shareholder governance.
Introduction
In economies some decisions, such as decisions on consumption, saving and work, are made individually while other decisions, such as decisions on production and policy, are made collectively. In case of competitive markets each of the two types of decisions improves the performance of the other type of decisions: 1. utility maximization results in equalization of marginal rates of substitution across consumers so consumers agree unanimously on profit maximization as the aim for collective decisions; 2. profit maximization results in equalization of technical rates of substitution; and, 3. the outcomes are Pareto optimal. However in case of market failures such as externalities, imperfect competition, incomplete financial markets and public goods the outcomes of profit maximization are not necessarily Pareto optimal.
In the present paper the interaction between individual and collective decisions is studied in a general equilibrium model with competitive markets and externalities between firms. Since the performance of markets with profit maximizing firms is not efficient in presence of externalities, different kinds of regulation such as Pigovian taxes have been considered. However profit maximization is typically not in the interest of the consumers. Indeed consumers typically have conflicting interests: at one extreme a consumer with shares in only one firm wants that firm to maximize its own profit corresponding to no internalization; and, at the other extreme a consumer with the average portfolio wants every firm to maximize aggregate profit of the production sector corresponding to perfect internalization. Note that in models with representative consumers such as most macroeconomic models as well as models, where every agent has some fraction of the market portfolio such as the CAPM model of finance, all consumers agree that the aggregate profit of the production sector should be maximized. The argument is illustrated in Hansen & Lott (1996) .
The decision making in firms in casee of market failures has received some attention for quite many years. One strand of research has focused on the aim of the firm. Contributions include Drèze (1974 Drèze ( , 1985 , Grossman & Hart (1979) , Dierker & Grodal (1999) , Bejan (2008) , Dierker & Dierker (2010) and Magill, Quinzii & Rochet (2010) . Another strand of research has focused on the outcome of majority voting. Contributions include DeMarzo (1993), Tvede & Crès (2005) and Crès (2008) . In Tvede & Crès (2005) it is shown that classical aim proposed in Drèze (1974) can result in production plans that are not in the interest of a majority of the shareholders.
Suppose that production plans are decided by majority voting such that a production plan is stable if and only if no other productiton plan is supported by a majority of consumers. Then questions like who is voting and how does voting perform with respect to internalization of externalities become central. Two governances are considered: the shareholder governance (one share, one vote); and, the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), where every consumer is allowed to vote in every firm. In general every consumer wants firms to maximize a weighted sum of profits where the weights are the shares of the consumer. If there are more than two firms the median voter theorem does not apply. Therefore in order to ensure existence of stable production plans the rate of majority typically has to be larger than one half. In equilibrium consumers maximmize utility, production plans are stable and markets clear.
The relation between the distribution of shares and the performance of the economy is analyzed. Concerning existence of equilibrium it is shown that if the rate of majority is at least (n − 1)/n, where n is the number of firms, then an equilibrium exists. Concerning internalization of externalities it is shown that if the market portfolio is in the cone of the portfolios of every coalition of consumers greater than the majority rate, then there exists an equilibrium with perfect internalization.
In general, a majority of shareholders in some firm tend to have more shares in that firm than in other firms, so they tend to put "too much" weight on the profit of that firm when voting over production plans. Therefore perfect internalization is typically not supported by the shareholder governance. In the stakeholder democracy the sets of voters in all firms are identical and the average voter has the same number of shares in every firm. Hence perfect internalization is more likely to occur. At first sight the stakeholder democracy appears unrealistic. However public regulation in democracies is a proxi of the stakeholder democracy.
In sports leagues, where cross ownership is prohibited for obvious reasons, the bodies of the leagues, where all clubs often have identical voting weights, aim at internalization of externalities. This is done through sharing broadcast revenue (especially for european soccer leagues) and matchday revenue as well as controlling the distribution of incoming talent (especially for american leagues). In contrast since spectators typically do not vote in the bodies of the leagues there is no internalization of pecuniary externalities between the leagues and the spectators. Therefore sports leagues should be expected to behave like monopolists. See Fort & Quirk (1995) , Vroman (1995) and Whitney (2005) for more on sports leagues.
Another example, where markets leads to internalization of externalities, is venture capital in Silicon Valley. In Saxenian (1994) it is documented that there is a substantial degree of information sharing across entrepreneurial firms. In Aoki (2000) it is suggested that venture capitalists ensure information sharing between entrepreneurial firms through cross ownership.
The present paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the set-up including assumptions and definition of equilbrium is presented; in Sections 3 and 4 the results on existence of equilibrium and internalization of externalities in equilibrium are stated and established; in Section 5 the shareholder governance and the stakeholder democracy are compared with respect to the performance of markets; and, finally in Section 6 some concluding remarks are offered.
The model
In the present section the set-up is outlined and the notion of equilibrium is introduced.
Set-up
Consider an economy with goods, m consumers and n firms.
Let p = (p 1 , . . . , p ), where p k > 0 for all k, be a price vector. Price vectors are normalized such that their coordinates sum to one. Let S = { v ∈ R | v k ≥ 0 for all k and k v k = 1 } be the set of normalized prices. Consumers are characterized by their identical consumption sets X = R , endowment vectors ω i ∈ R , utility functions u i : X → R and portfolios δ i = (δ i1 , . . . , δ in ) where δ ij ≥ 0 for all i and j and i δ ij = 1 for all j.
There are direct externalities between firms: in every firm an action is taken and the production plan of every firm depends on the actions taken in all firms. Firms are described by their sets of action A j ⊂ R q and production functions f j : j A j → R such that if a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), where a j ∈ A j for all j, is a list of individual actions, then y j = f j (a) is the production plan of firm j. Actions could include choice of some inputs or outputs. As an example to fix ideas suppose that firms choose inputs and that output in every firm depends on aggregate inputs: if capital K j ≥ 0 is chosen in firm j, then the production plan of firm j is (−K j , ( j =j K j ) α K β j ) where α, β > 0. In the traditional approach to externalities in general equilibrium firms are described by correspondences Y j : (R ) n−1 → R such that if y −j = (y 1 , . . . , y j−1 , y j+1 , . . . , y n ) is a list of individual production plans for all firms but firm j, then the production set of firm j is Y j (y −j ). However the traditional approach is adequate to study of internalization of externalities. Indeed if the production plan of firm j is changed, then the production set of firm j changes too. Therefore it might be that the production plan of firm j is not possible anymore. Alternatively it might be that other, more attractive production plans become available. Hence if the production plan of firm j is changed, then the production plan of firm j might change too. Thus in the traditional approach if consumers are considering to change the production plan of firm j, then they need to have conjectures or form expectations about how the production plans of the other firms will change. The approach of the present paper is more adequate as it eliminates the need to introduce and consider conjectures and expectations.
Demand, supply and equilibrium
For a price vector p and a list of individual actions a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), where a j ∈ A j for all j, the problem of consumer i is max
The problem of firm j takes a few steps. For a price vector p and a list of individual actions a let P ij (p, a) ⊂ A j be the set of actions in firm j that make consumer i better off than a j so
For a price vector p, a list of individual actions a and another action a j for firm j let M j (p, a, a j ) ⊂ {1, . . . , m} be the set of consumers who are better off with a j than with a j so
Let ρ ∈ [0, 1] be the rate of majority needed to change actions in firms and let θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ), where θ j = (θ 1j , . . . , θ mj ) and θ ij ≥ 0 and i θ ij = 1, be the voting weights. For a change of actions from a j to a j in firm j the change wins if and only if i∈M j (p,a,a j ) θ ij > ρ. Two cases of voting weights are considered: the shareholder governance where θ ij = δ ij (one share, one vote); and, the stakeholder democracy where θ ij = 1/m (one stakeholder, one vote).
For a price vector p and a list of individual actions a, let Q ρ j (p, a) ⊂ A j be the set of actions preferred to a j in firm j so
For a price vector p and a list of individual actions a −j for all firms but firm j, the problem of firm j is to find an action a j such that Q ρ j (p, a j , a −j ) = ∅.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a price vector, a list of individual consumption bundles and a list of individual actions (p,x,ā) such that:
(C)x i is a solution to the problem of consumer i givenp andā for all i.
(F)ā j is a solution to the problem of firm j givenp andā −j for all j.
Internalization
Consider an equilibrium (p,x,ā). In case of no internalization, where every firm maximizes its own profit, the profit maximization problem of firm j is
Typically the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto optimal.
In case of perfect internalization, where every firm maximizes aggregate profit, the profit maximization problem of firm j is
The equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
Results
In the present section results assumptions are introduced and results are presented. Proofs are postponed to the next section.
Assumptions
Consumers are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
All assumptions are standard.
The firms are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(A.4) The set of actions A j is convex and compact.
The assumptions ensure that the comprehensive hull of the production set { y ∈ R n | y k j ≤ f k j (a) for all j and k and some a ∈ A } is convex.
Existence of equilibrium
The conflicts between voters over the choices of actions can be reformulated as conflicts over the relative weights on profits in firms. Therefore the majority rate needed to ensure existence of equilibrium depends on the number of firms.
Theorem 1 Suppose that
Then every economy has an equilibrium.
The proof rests on two observations. The first observation is that for a coalition of consumers M j ⊂ {1, . . . , n} if the action of firm j is chosen to maximize j δ j p·j (a j , a −j ), where (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) is in the cone of the portfolios of the consumers in M j , then there is no a j such that all consumers in M j are better off. The second observation is that if ρ ≥ (n − 1)/n, then the intersection of all cones of portfolios for coalitions of consumers with more than ρ votes is non-empty. Therefore if the action of firm j is chosen to maximize a weighted sum of profits j δ j p · f j (a j , a −j ), where the weights (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) are in the intersection of the cones of the portfolios of consumers with more than ρ ≥ (n − 1)/n votes, then actions are stable.
Internalization in equilibrium
There is perfect internalization if the market portfolio is in the cone of the portfolios of every coalition of consumers with more than the majority rate votes.
Theorem 2 For an economy suppose that for every firm j and every coalition of consumers M j with i∈M j θ ij > ρ there exists (λ i ) i∈M j with λ i ≥ 0 for all i such that i∈M j
Then the economy has an equilibrium with perfect internalization.
The proof rests on two observations mentioned after Theorem 1 and a third observation: if the condition of the Theorem is satisfied, then the portfolio δ = (1, . . . , 1) is in the intersection of all the cones of portfolios for coalitions of consumers with more than ρ votes. Therefore if the action of firm j is chosen to maximize j p · f j (a j , a −j ) for all j, then there is perfect internalization and actions are stable.
Aims of firms
Let Γ ⊂ R n be defined by Γ = { γ ∈ R n + | j γ j = 1 }. For the shareholder governance every coalition M j , where i∈M j δ ij > ρ, has veto power. For I j ⊂ 2 m being the set of coalitions with veto power in firm j let Γ SG j ⊂ Γ be the set of weights that is in the intersection of the convex cones of portfolios of coalitions with veto power under the shareholder governance
For the stakeholder democracy every coalition M of consumers, where |M | > ρm, has veto power. For I ⊂ 2 m being the set of coalitions with veto power let Γ SD ⊂ Γ be the set of weights that is in intersection of the convex cones of portfolios of coalitions with veto power under the stakeholder democracy
For the shareholder governance if shareholders in different firms put different weights on profits, then actions do not maximize a weighted sum of profits under a richness condition on the prodution sector.
Theorem 3 Consider the shareholder governance. For all equilibria (p,x,ā) suppose that ifā is maximizing j δ j p · f j (a) for some δ / ∈ Γ SG j , then there exist j and a j such that j δ jp ·f j (a j ,ā −j ) > j δ jp ·f j (ā) for all δ ∈ Γ SG j . If ∩ j Γ SG j = ∅, then in every equilibriumā does not maximize j δ j p · f j (a) for any δ ∈ Γ.
For the shareholder governance if majorities of shareholders in different firms have different interests, then increasing profits of some firms without decreasing profits of other firms is possible according to Theorem 3. In order to discuss the assumption of Theorem 3 suppose that production functions are differentiable and actions are in the interior of sets of actions. Then the assumption in Theorem 3 is satisfied if the n × q-matrix defined by
has rank n − 1 for some j . Clearly the matrix cannot have rank n becauseā maximizing j δ j p · f j (a) implies that k D a j δ jp t f j (ā) = 0. Suppose that the matrix has rank n − 1, then for every marginal change of profits ∆π orthogonal to δ, there exists a marginal change of actions ∆a j such that if actions are changed by ∆a j , then profits are changed by ∆π. Suppose that
and let ∆π be defined by
Then it is straight forward and somewhat tedious to show that δ · ∆π = 0 and γ · ∆π > 0 for all γ ∈ Γ SG j . For the stakeholder democracy actions maximize a weighted sum of profits under a richness condition on the production sector.
Theorem 4 Consider the stakeholder democracy. For all equilibria (p,x,ā) suppose that ifā is maximizing j δ j p · f j (a) for some δ / ∈ Γ SD , then there exist j and a j such j δ jp · f j (a j ,ā −j ) > j δ jp · f j (ā) for all δ ∈ Γ SD . Then in every equilibriumā maximizes j δ jp · f j (a) for some δ ∈ Γ SD .
For the stakeholder democracy increasing profits of some firms without decreasing profits of other firms is impossible according to Theorem 4. The discussion of the assumption in Theorem 3 applies to the assumption in Theorem 4.
Neither the shareholder governance nor the stakeholder democracy necessarily support perfect internalization. In the shareholder governance every firm has its own aim. If these aims differ, then the outcome is less than perfect internalization. In the stakeholder democracy all firms have the same aim. However if the aim is not maximization of aggregate profit, then the outcome is less than perfect internalization.
Proofs
Following Tvede & Crès (2005) an artificial economy is used. The problem of the firm is decomposed into a profit maximization problem and a selection problem of price vector for profit maximization.
Let ∆ ⊂ R n be defined by
Let M ⊂ {1, . . . , m} be the set of consumers with shares in some firms so
Let the correspondence V i : S × ∆ → ∆ associate every price vector p in S and vector µ in ∆ with the set of vectors µ in ∆ closer to
Let the correspondence N : S × ∆ × ∆ → M associate every price vector p in S and pair of vectors µ and µ in ∆ with the set of consumers with
Let the correspondence W ρ j : S × ∆ → ∆ associate price vector p and vector v in ∆ with the set of vectors v in ∆ prefered to v, so
Definition 2 An artificial equilibrium is a list of individual vectors in ∆, a price vector, a list of individual consumption bundles and a list of individual actions (μ,p,x,ā) such that:
(C)x i is a solution to the problem of consumer i givenp andā for all i;
(F')ā j maximizes the profit of firm j givenμ j , soā j is a solution to
The problems of the firms in Definition 2 are artificial in the sense that they are not related to the preferences of the consumers. However as shown in Lemma 1 if (μ,p,x,ā) is an artificial equilibrium, then (p,x,ā) is a equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Suppose that (μ,p,x,ā) is an artificial equilibrium, then (p,x,ā) is an equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that (μ,p,x,ā) is an artificial equilibrium. Then (C) and (E) are satisfied. Therefore it suffice to show that (F) is satisfied. The strategy of the proof is to show that if Q ρ j (p,ā) = ∅, then W ρ j (p,μ) = ∅. Suppose that Q ρ j (p,ā) = ∅, then there exists j and a j ∈ A j such that i∈M j (p,ā,a j )
Hence if Q ρ j (p,ā) = ∅ then W ρ j (p,μ) = ∅. Thus if (μ,p,x,ā) is an artificial equilibrium, then (p,x,ā) is an equilibrium. 2
For p ∈ R ++ let π i (p) in ∆ for consumer i be defined by
Then π i (p) is the ideal point of consumer i in the sense that V i (p, π i (p)) = ∅. For a subset of consumers M j ⊂ M let co {π i } i∈M j be the convex hull of the ideal points for the consumers in M j . Clearly if (μ,p,x,ā) is an artificial equilibrium, thenμ j is in the set co {π i } i∈M for all j and the set co {π i } i∈M has dimension n − 1. For firm j and rate of majority ρ let M ρ j ⊂ 2 m be the family of subsets of consumers in M with voting weight greater than ρ, so M j ⊂ M ρ j if and only if i∈M j θ ij > ρ.
Proof of Theorem 1
According to Greenberg (1979) 
For p and a −j the problem of the firm j is
It follows from Berge's maximum theorem that the solution correspondence α j : S × A −j → A j of firm j is upper hemi-continuous and convex valued and the profit function ψ j : S × A −j → R is continuous.
Let v L , v U ∈ R be such that if a j ∈ α j (p, a −j ) for some p and a −j , then v k L < f k j (a j , a −j ) < v k U for all j and k. Let w ∈ R be such that if u i (x i ) ≥ u i (ω i + j δ ij v j ), then x k i > w k for all i and k. Let the truncated consumption set X T ⊂ R be defined by
Then for p and a the truncated problem of consumer i is max
It follows from Berge's maximum theorem that the demand correspondence β i : S × j A j → X T is upper hemi-continuous and convex valued. For x and a the price problem is
It follows from Berge's maximum theorem that the price correspondence γ : (X T ) m × j A j → S is upper hemi-continuous and convex valued. Let the correspondence Γ : β 1 (p, a) , . . . , β m (p, a), α 1 (p, a −1 ), . . . , α n (p, a)).
It follows from Kakutani's fixed point theorem that the correspondence has a fixed point (p,x,ā) . Clearly (μ,p,x,ā) is an artificial equilibrium so (p,x,ā) is an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2
For every firm j and every coalition of consumers M j with i∈M j θ ij > ρ suppose that there exists λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ m ) with λ i ≥ 0 for all i such that i∈M j
Therefore it follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that there exists an equilibrium with perfect internalization.
Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose thatā is maximizing a weighted sum of profits for some weights γ. Then there there exists j and a j such γ / ∈ Γ SG j and every consumer with normalized portfolio in Γ SG j gets a higher dividend. The voting weight in firm j of the consumers with normalized portfolio in Γ SG j is larger than ρ. Thereforeā is not part of the equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose thatā does not maximize a weighted sum of profits for any weights in Γ SD . Then there exist j and a j such every consumer with normalized portfolio in Γ SD gets a higher dividend. The voting weight of the consumers with a normalized portfolio in Γ SD is larger than ρ. Thereforeā is not part of the equilibrium.
Shareholders or stakeholders?
In the present section the shareholder governance and the stakeholder democracy are compared. First we provide a couple of examples to illustrate the possible outcomes of the shareholder governance and the stakeholder democracy. Second we use parts of the literature on social choice to provide some more general insights.
Some examples
Assumed that there are two firms and that the rate of majority is one half to keep the discussion simple.
Example 1: Suppose that: the distribution of shares is symmetric around the diagonal, so if there exists a consumer with portfolio δ = (δ 1 , δ 2 ), then there exists a consumer with portfolio (δ 2 , δ 1 ); and, there exists a consumer with a portfolio (δ 1 , δ 2 ) where δ 2 = δ 1 . The first property reflects that there are no wealth effects in portfolios in the sense that their distribution is independent of their size: it is not the case that consumers with small portfolios tend to have more shares in firm 1 and consumers with large portfolios tend to have more shares in firm 2 or vice versa. The second property reflects a conflict in the sense that at least one consumer wants to put more weight on the profit of firm 1 than on the profit of firm 2 (and at least one other consumer wants to put more weight on the profit of firm 2 than on the profit of firm 1). An example of such a distribution of portfolios is shown in Figure 1 Consider the weights (λ 1 , λ 2 ) for profit maximization in firm 1. These weights are stable in the voting process if votes are equally distributed below and above the half line through 0 and (λ 1 , λ 2 ). Perfect internalization demands that weights for profit maximization on the diagonal (δ 1 = δ 2 ) are stable.
For the shareholder governance, the shareholders with more shares in firm 1 than in firm 2 have more than 50 pct. of the votes in firm 1. Hence there is more than 50 pct. of the votes below the diagonal so the shareholder governance does not support perfect internalization.
For the stakeholder democracy the shareholders with more shares in firm 1 than in firm 2 have 50 pct. of the votes. In equilibrium the relative weights have to be between the two thin lines. Thus the stakeholder democracy does support perfect internalization.
Example 2: Suppose that there are wealth effects. An example of such a distribution of portfolios is shown in Figure 2 below. Suppose that the consumer with the large portfolio has something like 55 pct. of the shares in firm 1 and 45 pct. of the shares in firm 2 and that the three consumers with more shares in firm 2 than in firm 1 have around five times more shares in firm 2 than in firm 1. In firm 1 the shareholder with a large portfolio has a majority on its own. Therefore in equilibrium for the shareholder governance, the relative weight on the profits in firm 1 is 55/45. Hence internalization is not supported, but a high degree of internalization is supported. In equilibrium for the stakeholder democracy the relative weight on the profits in firm 1 and firm 2 is 1/5. Thus only a very low degree of internalization is supported.
The discussion above is based on a couple of figures, but convey the insight that if there are many small shareholders and no wealth effects, then the stakeholder democracy is likely to support perfect internalization whereas the shareholder governance does not.
Social choice
There are at most m shareholders, where consumer i wants firm j to maximize p · j δ ij f j (a). Therefore the conflict over the choice of actions a j ∈ A j in firm j can be reformulated as a conflict over the relative weights (λ jj ) j with λ j1 , . . . , λ jn ≥ 0 and j λ jj = 1 on profits in firms max a j ∈A j p · j λ jj f j (a j , a −j ). The parameters of the conflict over the relative weights are the portfolios (δ i ) i of the consumers.
The dimension of the set of relative weights is n − 1. In Greenberg (1979) the median voter theorem is generalized to multi-dimensional sets and the result is that if the majority rate is at least (n − 1)/n, then there exists a equilibrium and the equilibrium weights may be considered as the portfolio of the generalized median shareholder. Theorem 1 builds on Greenberg (1979) .
With assumptions about the distribution of portfolios it is possible to characterize some of the stable outcomes and lower the super-majority rate needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. Suppose that the distribution of portfolios is symmetric around the market portfolio line (no wealth effects), then according to Grandmont (1978) the average portfolio is stable (as relative weights) for the simple majority rate σ = 0.5. Next, suppose that there is a continuum of consumers and that the distribution of portfolios is ρ-concave for some ρ ≥ 0 (if ψ is the density and (ψ(δ)) α is concave, then ψ(δ) is α-concave), then according to Caplin & Nalebuff (1991) the average portfolio is stable (as relative weights) for σ ≥ 1 − 1/e ≈ 0.64.
Continuing to assume that there is a continuum of consumers and that the distribution of portfolios is α-concave, for the shareholder governance the average portfolio in firm j is i δ ij δ i . Hence unless the group of owners { i | δ ij > 0 } of firm j is identical to the group of owners { i | δ ik > 0 } of firm k for all pairs of firms j and k, the average portfolios in some firms are not the market portfolio. Thus the shareholder governance does not support perfect internalization. For the stakeholder democracy the average portfolio in firm j is the market portfolio i δ i . Therefore the stakeholder democracy does support perfect internalization.
Concluding remarks
A couple of natural extensions come into mind: negative amounts of shares; and, externalities between firms and consumers. Firstly for negative amounts of shares, the analysis should carry over except that the rate of super majority needed to ensure existence of equilibrium in Theorem 1 has to be increased to n/(n + 1) because relative weights (λ jk ) k cannot be normalized by k λ jk = 1. Secondly for externalities such as pollution of the environment between firms and consumers, externalities are described by preferences of consumers rather than by portfolios. Therefore the dimension of the conflict is m rather than n − 1 and there is no natural generalization of Theorem 2. However assuming that preferences are intermediateà la Grandmont (1978) seems to be a promising approach to the study of the performance of markets in the presence of externalities between firms and consumers.
